Daily Report

Latin America

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Group of 8 To Meet in Punta del Este

PY132310 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1458 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Brasilia, 13 Oct (EFE)—Brazilian officials today confirmed that the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela will meet in Punta del Este, Uruguay, between 23 and 25 October to prepare for a presidential summit that the heads of state of these countries will hold in November in Mexico.

The foreign ministers of the Group of Eight, which is comprised of the members of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group, will prepare the documents that will be signed by their presidents, and will approve a schedule of consultation meetings to outline a joint strategy that will take into account the international political and economic situation.

The eight Latin American presidents will meet in Acapulco on 27 and 28 November. High on the agenda will be the Central American conflict and the continent's economic situation.

Before the foreign ministers meeting, their advisers will meet in Montevideo to study documents on the restructuring of regional economic relations, the Latin American cultural identity, and the measures that are needed to attain balanced development.

The three documents were drawn up by Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay.

According to government sources, the foreign ministers of the eight countries will meet once again before the presidential summit in San Francisco, during the OAS deliberations.

OTHER COUNTRIES

Haiti

CEP Proclamation to the People Published
FL151545 Port-au-Prince LE NOUVELLISTE in French No 33.106, 13 Oct 87 pp 1,12

[LE NOUVELLISTE headline:"Provisional Electoral Council Proclamation"]

[Text] People of Haiti: The Provisional Electoral Council [CEP] once again salutes your courage and your lucidity. Together with all those who have joined the CEP in working for successful elections, you have set up the important organization which is to effect the delicate operations, so new to both you and ourselves, that elections entail.

It is true that the gumbo is hot, but we are all'Kanzos' [practitioners of voodoo exhibiting immunity to fire]. We will eat it out of the palm of our hand. [preceding two sentences in Creole] We will hold elections.

Today, in view of your determination—and also in view of your uneasiness—we wish to reaffirm to you that regardless of the risk involved, we will carry out the principal mandate you gave us back on 29 March, when you ratified the Constitution, and which you renewed on 29 June by beginning the long series of protests in support of constitutional order which you signed in blood—your own and that of your children.

Those who do not want to relax by even a millimeter the viselike grip they are used to having on this country and who have squeezed out of the country and your own lives the most incredible wealth for themselves, have tried, and are still trying, to drag you and us onto a terrain chosen by them.

We refuse to follow them. We will instead cling fast to our mandate. We solemnly promise to refer to all existing national and international documentation that you may have accumulated and which you must send us, using the procedure provided in the electoral law. To this we will add (books, archives, contracts, official documents, reports of international investigations, visual and audiovisual documents, official reports of the carrying out of death sentences, direct testimony, complaints received, etc) [parentheses as published] which we ourselves have gathered in order to publicly support the decisions to which Article 291 of the Constitution commits us.

Once again, you and we are going to oppose verbal violence and the violence of weapons, calmly and without violence or rancor, with our will to apply the constitution. The CEP invites you to this.

To those to whom this rejection is addressed, we say: Be rational. You have done enough. Return to yourselves. Be reborn. You must have known moments of love for this country—in your youth perhaps, or in childhood. Awaken these slumbering values. They are more real than your comfort, your wealth, and your blindness. Awaken them and you will cease to be an apparent obstacle to those who have already suffered such pain and who wish to give all, with enthusiasm and in unity, in order to achieve in the eyes of the world a new miracle before the end of the century. Such an attitude will be your most generous contribution to the fatherland. Perhaps—who knows?—there may still be a valid, though discrete, role for you to play.

The CEP has never, nor will it ever, interpret Article 291 as though it was meant to exclude an entire category of Haitians from the nation's life. Exclusion will not serve to put an end to a regime that was based on exclusion.

We can understand that you are still a little drunk on power, on the fear you inspire, on the fact that you are already being courted by those who believe that by betting that you will return in force, they are taking no chances.

There again, we say to you that your roots have been severed. The suckers through which your system drew its nourishment have been torn away, leaving, it is true, a still-powerful machine, but a machine condemned to death by the people and by history.

Haitian people, we of the CEP offer you our lives. In exchange, we ask only one thing: that you do the impossible so that you can, together with us, hold elections. Do it right from the beginning, at the CASEC [Administrative Council for the Communal Section] level. In this way the people of the hinterlands will for the first time be able to exercise control over the government and send the government its own ministers, as provided for in our Constitution.

If we are being threatened, it is because those who took from you your children, your women, your brothers, and your parents are today concerned with you only with a view to the continuation of a political system which you, the Haitian people, acting as a whole, rejected on 7 February 1986. They are asking you to destroy, even before they do, the Constitution. Why must there be further crime in order to attain a single presidential position? Be rational, Haitian people, for the CEP is working only for you, and in the light of your Constitution.

[Signed] for the CEP: Pierre C. Labissiere, vice president; Marc Alex Guerrier, secretary, PCL/MAG/MMD PROCLAMA.[as published; no expansion provided]

Radio Metropole Conducts Election Poll
FL131415 Bonaire Trans World Radio in English 1230 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Haitian businessman-farmer (Louis DeJoie) and Pastor Sylvio Claude are favorites to win next month's presidential elections, according to the results of an opinion poll reported yesterday.

One conclusion from the survey of 868 people in two rural regions is that the overwhelming majority has not yet decided how to vote in Haiti's first presidential elections in 30 years. Radio Metropole says its reporters carried out the poll in villages and small towns in the north and southwest of the country during the first week of October.

El Salvador

Rey Prendes, Party Leaders on Amendments

PA140206 San Salvador EL MUNDO in Spanish 9 Oct 87 p 36

[Article by Rene Hurtado; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Regarding the FMLN-FDR position that the Constitution be amended to resolve the conflict, Culture and Communications Minister Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes said that "of course, some parts of the Constitution can be amended, but there are some that cannot be touched."

He said that recently the opposition parties discussed the possibility of amending the Constitution, but that the sections concerning the democratic system, the Armed Forces' functions and responsibilities, and other sections such as the one referring to national sovereignty cannot be amended. According to Rey Prendes, "there are parts that can be amended, such as the composition of the Central Electoral Council [CCE] and other aspects."

Through Shafick Handal and Guillermo Manuel Ungo, the FMLN-FDR announced that "one of the conditions for arriving at a cease-fire would have to be the amendment of the Constitution, and that if the government is sticking to the Constitution it must carry this out to find a political solution to the nation's conflict." The sources said that, in addition to the amendments, a government comprising all sectors and a single army composed of the Armed Forces and the guerrilla forces would have to be established."

According to Rafael Moran Castaneda of the PCN [National Conciliation Party], the guerrillas are asking for amendments to the Constitution "but are not saying what articles have to be amended. The Constitution is a very broad document, and there is no need to amend it."

"I understand that there cannot be any amendments to the three government branches or to the presidential system to turn it into a parliamentary system. It would be illogical and preposterous to talk about the existence of two armies or about merging them." He who wins power has every right to organize the Army as he sees fit."

According to Armando Calderon Sol of ARENA [Nationalist Republican Alliance], his party "has always upheld the principle of legality and the laws in resolving problems, and the Constitution is, above all, the cornerstone of the country's institutionality. The Constitution can be amended according to its own provisions, and we would not oppose amending it if it is legal."

For ARENA to participate in the debate and discussions, "constitutional rights must be observed," Calderon said. He added that according to Article 248 of the Constitution, "the articles referring to the form and type of government system, the country's territory, and presidential succession can in no case be amended."

Another legal aspect of the amendments being requested is that "they must be proposed by at least 10 deputies to the Legislative Assembly, approved by 31 votes, and ratified by at least two-thirds of the Legislative Assembly, that is, by 45 deputies, after which the decree would be issued," Calderon noted.

If in the opinion of the government and the two largest parties—PCN and ARENA—the Constitution may be amended, these two parties would have to study the articles to be amended in order to give their views and to determine that no constitutional provisions would be violated. However, the FMLN-FDR have not said what articles should be amended for the subversives to join the democratic process. Moran said an amendment to the constitutional provision on the composition of the CCE may be requested because this can, indeed, be amended.

PSD Reaches Accord With Ungo, Zamora Parties

PA151448 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] The Social Democratic Party [PSD] announced this afternoon that it has reached an agreement with Guillermo Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement and Ruben Zamora's Social Christian People's Movement to begin joint action to seek democratic unity.

A communique from the Social Democratic Party, led by Dr Mario Reni Roldan, stated that the agreement was reached in Mexico City where the political commissions of the three parties held a meeting. The communique stated that in the meeting substantial areas of agreement among the three parties were found, both in the evaluation of the Salvadoran situation as well as in the possible solutions.

This agreement, which is interpreted as a coalition, could lead to a leftist bloc for the next legislative elections and to Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora's return to the country.

Church Urges 'Atmosphere of Liberty'

PA140427 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1819 GMT 11 Oct 87

[Text] San Salvador, 11 Oct (ACAN-EFE)—The Salvadoran Catholic Church today urged that the resettlement of the 4,500 refugees who returned this weekend from Honduras be carried out within an "atmosphere of liberty" in which they will be able to renew their lives outside the war situation in El Salvador.

San Salvador Bishop Msgr Gregorio Rosa Chavez reported this morning that the remainder of the 4,500 Salvadoran refugees who were in the Mesa Grandes and Colomoncagua refugee camps in Honduras will return to El Salvador today.

Rosa Chavez said that the refugees began returning to El Salvador on Saturday and will go back to their hometowns, such as Las Vueltas, San Antonio Los Ranchos, Guajiba, and Copapayo in the war-torn Chalatenango, Cuscatlan, and Cabanas Departments.

The Salvadoran prelate described the Salvadorans' return as the "greatest thing done in Latin America." The refugees are returning under the direction of the church, humanitarian institutions, and the UNHCR.

Bishop Rosa Chavez pointed out that the "critical point" of this operation is not in meeting the basic needs of the refugees, but "in the future that awaits them," inasmuch as the majority of them will go back to their hometowns, most of them in areas where the government and the guerrillas are fighting.

In his Sunday homily, the auxiliary bishop of San Salvador said that "the problem is whether the parties in conflict who are armed with rifles will know how to respect the dignity of the poor people."

After the mass, Rosa Chavez was more specific about the resettlements. He told the press that "they (the needy ones as well as the refugees) carry most of the burden of the war. They are—and please excuse the expression—like a rag ball that is kicked around by many and finally abandoned."

He added that "it is necessary to create areas of freedom and self-determination. We do not believe in selective resettlements, because these prolong the war as they are used as support by both sides."

Rosa Chavez explained that the Catholic Church and other local non-Catholic churches will meet the food, health, and education needs of the refugees. He explained, however, that they will not become support mechanisms for either the Duarte government or the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Since early 1980 thousands of Salvadorans—at least 30,000—have fled to Honduras. They fled from the Salvadoran war that began 7 years ago and that has left over 60,000 dead.

The Salvadorans were placed in refugee camps in Honduras, along the border area. The larger camps are the ones at Mesa Grande and Colomoncagua. The church and the UNHCR helped the refugees.

Approximately 4,500 refugees decided—without the Salvadoran Government's authorization—to return this weekend and resettle in the towns they left when the civil war worsened.

Repatriation began yesterday when several dozen buses and trucks brought back the Salvadorans, who lived in poverty in Honduras because--among other things—they were charged with providing supplies to the guerrillas.

Guatemala

General on Coup Rumors, Talks With Rebels

PA150450 Guatemala City Radio Nuevo Mundo in Spanish 1200 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] Deputy Defense Minister General Arturo Guillermo de la Cruz has said the ideal of a prosperous Guatemala lies in the spirit of unity in the military institutions. Its members contributed to the current framework of liberty shared by all Guatemalans. He said any rumors of division or coups are unfounded because this framework exists. The remarks by Acting Defense Minister Gen Arturo Guillermo de la Cruz were meant to dismiss rumors of a coup d'etat in view of the country's current situation.

He said that the dispute between the government and CACIF [Coordination Committee of Farming, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations] is seen as a normal process within the democratic framework and that it will gradually be settled because there is full confidence security will return.

It should not be a surprise that the first meeting with the subversives yielded no immediate results, according to the acting defense minister. He was referring to the talks with subversives in Madrid. De la Cruz said it was known beforehand that no agreement would be reached. He added that this should come as no surprise to anyone.

Although a door has been opened for further contacts, the Army is ruling out new talks with the rebel leaders. There will be no other meetings with rebel leaders such as the one in Madrid, as the first one was part of the Esquipulas II peace agreement, said acting Defense Minister Gen Guillermo de la Cruz. He said a new meeting would be completely unnecessary.

According to Gen de la Cruz, the Guatemalan rebel movement is only a nuisance and does not threaten to bring unrest.

There was no cease-fire during the Madrid talks between the government and the rebels, as the rebels had announced. The acting defense minister confirmed that, saying the rebels continued their hostilities. Because of this, the government is obligated to preserve national security, he said.

Nicaragua

D., H. Ortega Reject Contra Talks Proposal

PA160154 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0119 GMT 16 Oct 87

[Text] Managua, 15 Oct (ACAN-EFE)—President Daniel Ortega said today that if the contra leaders accept amnesty they can return to Nicaragua; "otherwise, they will go to jail even if they arrive accompanied by U.S. congressmen."

This was the Sandinist leader's reply to the leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance, who today announced their intention to send a delegation to Managua before 7 November, without prior conditions, to negotiate a cease-fire.

Defense Minister Humberto Ortega made a similar statement in a speech delivered in Masaya, 30 km south of Managua, repeating that the Sandinists will never negotiate with those "subservient and homeless traitors of Chamorro, Robelo, Calero, and others."

"They are trying to generate propaganda by coming here on a plane with journalists and congressmen to force us to hold talks with them," said Humberto Ortega. He added that "we are never going to recognize them as determinant political elements in the war."

The defense minister emphasized once more that "Nicaragua must negotiate with the chief of the mercenary forces—that is, with Mr Ronald Reagan—but not with those little democratic men who are cosmetic elements of his administration."

Humberto Ortega was emphatic in stating that under the present process, the Sandinists will never accept "negotiations that betray the sacred interests of this revolution."

D. Ortega on Peace Dialogue, LA PRENSA

PA152025 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0300 GMT 15 Oct 87

[News conference by President Daniel Ortega with unidentified reporters after ceremony marking 10th Victorious October Anniversary on 14 October; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] In a speech broadcast by La Voz de Nicaragua, President Oscar Arias said please [words indistinct] to establish a cease-fire with the contras. What do you think about that?

[Ortega] The Esquipulas agreement does not establish specific mechanisms, but permits each country to implement commitments according to its possibilities, circumstances, and the laws in effect in each country. I spoke by telephone with President Arias to congratulate him the day he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This was the subject of conversation. At this moment we have implemented a cease-fire and contact is being established on the battlefield. On the other hand [words indistinct] the United States.

[Reporter] Don't you think that if no efforts are made to reach a cease-fire, the United States will possibly renew its aid to the contras? Aren't you concerned about that?

[Ortega] I have not yet said that [words indistinct] 7 November. So far, many insurgents have put down their weapons. Perhaps by 7 November more advances will have been made and there will be better conditions for a generalized cease-fire. First we have to take this step. We cannot [words indistinct]. We have to see what happens and maintain a positive attitude because we have to think positively. We cannot think only of negative results. We have to think of positive results.

[Reporter] What will happen if the rightist Democratic Coordinating Board does not participate in the national dialogue?

[Ortega] It would simply be excluding itself, as it did from the elections. In the elections they were offered all sorts of possibilities and security. They chose not to participate. That is their problem. Now they are being given the possibility of participating in the dialogue. If they do not participate, that is their problem. We are doing our part. We complied [with the agreements] the moment we invited them. From that moment on, if someone does not want to participate that is his problem, not a government problem.

[Reporter] Regarding the opening of *La Prensa*?

[Ortega] This is verifiable. It can be verified that Nicaragua called all the opposition political groups to a dialogue and it can be verified that whoever wanted to participate in the dialogue has participated and those who did not participate failed to do so on their own decision and not because we excluded them.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] to contribute to the strengthening of the pacification process in the framework of Esquipulas. How do you view the publications of *La Prensa*? Are they contributing to this?

[Ortega] I do not want to characterize *La Prensa* publications. I have not read all the *La Prensa* issues because I was in the United States for more than a week. I do hope that *La Prensa* contributes, even while maintaining its position at variance with that of the government. It is entitled to disagree with the government, but I hope it contributes to the peace process, to the implementation of the agreements.

[Reporter] Mr President, in the cease-fire areas have there been contacts with contra organization chiefs? Is there such a case, a case of negotiations involving, for example, an amnesty for a large contingent of contras?

[Ortega] The case I know about is that of the contingent in the Atlantic sector that accepted the amnesty. Similar contacts have been established in other parts of the country, in the central region, and we are awaiting results.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] national decisions?

[Ortega] The fact that I have touched on a subject such as the October issue is evidence of the unity that exists in the Sandinist front. If there were no unity in the Sandinist Front I could not touch on that subject because it involves the division problem the front had at that time and [words indistinct] and interpretation.

But since there is unity, we have wanted to make it very clear that the Sandinist Front is united and that there are no grounds for saying that some Sandinists agree and others disagree with the Esquipulas agreements, for example.

Everybody can be sure, on the national and international level, that my signing of the Esquipulas agreements in Guatemala had the full backing of the FSLN National Directorate.

Cuadra Issues, Defends SMP Summons

PA140341 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1930 GMT 12 Oct 87

[Text] The Defense Ministry this morning issued another summons to register in the Patriotic Military Service [SMP] for youths in Zones 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and special zones. Major General Joaquin Cuadra, vice defense minister, summoned 17-year-old men to register. He also emphasized the importance of the youths' participation in defense tasks, which led to the signing of peace agreements in Guatemala.

The high-ranking military leader pointed out that this fourth summons to register in the SMP is not the result of recent circumstances, but is the result of the implementation of a plan that was forged after the first summons.

[Begin Cuadra recording] The Nicaraguan Defense Ministry, in complying with the SMP Law to ensure the implementation of defense plans of the fatherland and in exercising the powers granted to it by then SMP Law, Decree No (13-27) of 13 September 1983, states:

1. We summon all young men born in 1970 from Zones 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and Special Zones 1, 2, and 3 to register in SMP delegations. We also summon young men born between 1962 and 1969 who for various reasons have not yet registered to do so in the corresponding delegations.

2. Registration will be held throughout the country between 15 and 30 October 1987; each regional military delegation will hold registration on the dates specified in this summons.

3. Stationary registration offices will be established throughout the nation in locations specified in this summons; properly-identified mobile registration offices will also be established.

4. Registration in the SMP begins with the personal and obligatory appearance of the individual before stationary or mobile registration offices. In keeping with the SMP Law, information required by registration juntas must be provided.

5. Summoned youths who fail to appear at the registration offices will be violating the SMP Law of the Republic of Nicaragua as specified in Article 42, paragraph A.

That is the summons. I also wish to point out that we have established a little more than 1,000 registration offices throughout the country. A large number of comrades, who are properly trained, are permanently working in them. This is an important element allowing us to implement this registration process in an organized and efficient manner.

The experience accumulated by regional and zonal military delegations in implementing the SMP within the active military service and the reserves, which has been gained through the use of various organizational structures, is being applied to this process. As a result, at present we have achieved a high degree of maturity, efficiency, and responsibility in this process and its activities.

Finally, I wish to point out that this summons to register is not a circumstantial action; it does respond to a specific situation resulting from the war of aggression against our country. It is a normal institutionalized process within the implementation of the SMP Law. What I am saying is that although our country—from a military standpoint—is now experiencing difficult and tense moments as a result of the war of aggression, although there is political negotiation that encourages achievement of peace through the Esquipulas agreements, and although—as we hope—there will be calm, stable, and peaceful moments in our country, there will nevertheless always be military service summonses. All countries issue summonses for military service, regardless of their situation. All countries having military service laws do this. Therefore, this does not constitute an unusual activity given the current situation.

We emphasize the importance of this summons because it has been a vital element in achieving what we have achieved from the standpoint of the development of the war. It is vital from the standpoint of consolidation of the revolution's defense and the victorious struggle of our people in which our youths—through an organized compliance with the SMP—have made our people strong and given them a privileged position on the battlefield. Today, this allows us to take important and encouraging steps at the negotiating table in the incessant search for peace in our country and in all of Central America. [end recording]

Maj Gen Cuadra said that all regional peace commissions are operating in all specified cease-fire areas and have contacted counterrevolutionary leaders. He added that such areas will soon be expanded, but this will be done through a presidential decree.

Panama

PRD Document Requests Changes in Government

PA121850 Panama City LA REPUBLICA DOMINICAL in Spanish 11 Oct 87 pp 9, 10, 11

[Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) National Executive Committee (CEN) "document"; date not given]

[Text] Introduction [subhead]

The Democratic Revolutionary Party's National Executive Commission submits this document for critical analysis and debate by party members, in their respective popular fronts and province, area, and, district organizations, so that the document can be widely discussed and enhanced.

The document summarizes the previous debates of a team of PRD leaders, which is composed of coordinators of various commission that form the organizing council for the party's third congress. The team was commissioned by the CEN to analyze the country's present situation and determine the responsibilities of PRD and Torrijist forces to obtain clear and definite solutions.

This effort represents a candid and direct study of the situation, its causes and factors, and it makes a series of proposals that will interest Torrijists and all citizens. It is not, however, a diagnosis nor a thorough or complete proposal. It is rather a work document that the CEN is submitting for discussion so the party members can give their opinions and finalize its contents and projections.

The present crisis is one of the deepest, most persistent, and decisive events in our republican history. We are confronting a new situation, different from past experiences, and one in which the methods previously employed are not enough. This new stage has been developing for several years. Thus, its analysis must go further than the study of the present situation and its short-term solutions. It is imperative to identify the situation's causes that have accumulated during past years, as well as its internal factors. Only in this manner can the situation be understood so as to determine the alternatives and actions that must be developed.

Among these causes there are, mainly:

a) Internal factors linked to changes in the country's political and socio-economic conditions, parallel to the emergence of distortions in the Torrijist process;

b) External factors linked to U.S. pressures and interference and to the country's withdrawal from political and economic relations with foreign countries;

c) Political factors linked to the weakening and dispersion of the National Political Directorate and the vigorous Torrijist party program.

These and other factors intermix. Thus, they cannot be explained separately. The following is our study of these causes and factors.

1. Internal Factors [subhead]

The process of national liberation that stared almost 20 years ago brought together a diverse social front whose interests pointed toward the attainment of diverse reforms within the country. A short time after they were brought together, their activities centered on the central problem at the time: attainment of the signing and ratification of the canal treaties. The emphasis placed on the canal required the support of many social sectors and, because of it, the solution to other important problems was postponed.

After 1978, circumstances changed and the introduction of new methods and tasks was necessary. Besides the transformation that had to be resolved there was the need for the country's democratization. This could be expressed by perfecting and institutionalizing the new mechanisms of popular participation that had been created by the process or by returning to the traditional framework of formal liberal democracy. At the same time, there was a need to reconsider the existing alliances in order to regroup forces to deal with pending reforms and to maintain and strengthen these alliances for electoral purposes.

Under those circumstances, Omar Torrijos decided to "withdraw" [from political activities], based on his observations of the tendencies that prevailed in various parts of the continent (in favor of restoring formal democracy). Furthermore, the alliance scheme had lost force as it had fulfilled its role (some privileged groups were trying to return to a political system that would enable them to exclude other sectors in the exploitation of the recovered resources). Another factor was the initial effects of the international economic crisis, which reduced the means for satisfying the growing expectations derived from the signing of the treaties.

That withdrawal was planned together with the creation of a Torrijist party, with the idea of grouping and coordinating the sectors interested in defending what had already been achieved, mobilizing the majority sectors that wanted additional changes, and, with that in mind, facing the electoral, legislative, and governmental tasks as required. In other words, the party was and still is political insurance to strengthen the democratization [process] without giving up the Torrijist strategy of liberation and development.

The withdrawal-party combination was intended to begin a gradual transfer within the Torrijist sector of political functions from the military leadership to the party directorate. However, at that time the transfer was perceived differently by the various trends on both sides. These differences were due to the various positions regarding the fundamental problem that Panamanians have faced since then, which is to decide between two development models: the model of national liberation that prevailed from 1969 to 1978 aimed at concluding pending changes; or the neocolonial model that has prevailed since then, which seeks a dependent and submissive reconciliation with imperialism, returning to the traditional forms of power.

Although this dilemma has existed since 1978, Omar's death as well as that of other companeros also contributed to a deterioration of the National Political Directorate. The economic crisis and the strong emergence of Reagan's doctrine for the region—together with the political reorganization of the oligarchy, the political right, and its press—supplied fuel and pretexts for the neocolonial model, breaking the consensus and solidarity within the Torrijist front. Influential groups conveniently chose to follow the opportunist and simplist line, justified by the so-called "pragmatism" that General R. D. Paredes initially headed.

With the illusion or pretext of neutralizing the hostility of the Reaganist governmental team and obtaining foreign economic aid, the line was "leave the dead man [Torrijos] alone" and give up basic parts of Torrijism and its social and political alliances. That reconciling "pragmatism" called for establishing a center-right alliance. That alliance was supposedly "tactical" and sought to finally depoliticize the Armed Forces with the 1984 elections and to discontinue Panama's neutralistic, Latin Americanistic, and nonaligned international activities, in conformity with U.S. interests.

In order to obtain support from the right and the oligarchy, important instruments of social support, such as the mechanisms for popular consulation and representation, were sacrificed. This further contributed to facilitating the opposition's political initiative. A milestone of that degradation was the 1983 constitutional amendments. Simultaneously, the party's role was reduced to that of a simple passive mass for electoral support having no participation in critical functions or in political decisions. To that end, those who defended the party's original objectives were not given prominence within the party.

The excesses Paredes committed while making this change made his candidacy fizzle. But the web of alliances and the electoral rules and timetable were already being implemented. The basic concept, which favored the neocolonial plan of engaging in a rightist-style race against Arnulfo Arias in an alliance with an oligarchic sector, was maintained. Therefore, the necessary corrections were not made. As a result, we abandoned our own ground and fell into the trap of waging the campaign on the enemy's ground, where it had the upper hand and set the rules.

The presidential succession resulted in more traumas and additional costs, such as the resignation of President Aristides Royo as a result of the eagerness to submit the government's policy to the design and strategy of Gen Paredes' presidential aspirations. Furthermore, the deterioration in the system and the introduction of the neocolonial model continued and grew under President Nicolas Ardito Barletta. Pretty soon, a substantial number of Torrijists realized that a counterrevolutionary and capitulative strategy was being implemented.

The disarray in the leadership's overall policy combined with these developments lessened, in turn, control over the political behavior of various social groups. This was the case with the educational sector and parts of the health sector and subsequently with the financial sector and its employees, the transportation sector, and even public employees. As a whole, this meant a substantial weakening of state power.

Simultaneously, and since the party stopped carrying out mass actions to lead to new revolutionary and liberation struggles—limiting itself to preaching understanding, patience, and acceptance of situations that were distasteful and at odds with its platform—it lost its clout over sectors that were linked to Torrijism and its authority over many Torrijists, who began to disperse and even lose their sense of direction.

Thus, the party lost influence over several middle class sectors that had played an extremely important role in the Torrijist regime. During the early 1980's, most of the cadres that became Torrijist officials and party organizers came from the intellectual, professional, and small- and medium-sized business sectors. Most of these people had been leaders of the student, union, and people's movements in earlier years and had political training and experience.

However, beginning in 1983, these sectors began to be increasingly inactive and disinterested. Their hopes of being leaders and promoters of the social and national changes that still needed to be done were dashed. The

only important middle-class group that was not inactive was that of the Armed Forces officers, but these, too, lost clout when their civilian allies lost strength.

Progressive professionals ceased being the leading originators of bills and measures, for instance. The party, whose membership included 15,000 intellectuals and professionals, could no longer offer them the possibility of devising and directing the new reforms needed by the country. They were replaced by cadres and technocrats who advocated the neocolonial model and reconciliation with the oligarchy and international financial organizations. The concentration of wealth grew, particularly in the financial and speculative sectors in the metropolitan area. Policies calling for the redistribution of wealth and for meeting the demands of the middle class and low-income sectors were scrapped.

For a growing number of middle-class sectors, their groups became places for civic and political expression. These groups began playing a more relevant role. However, behind their demands for democratization, moralization, and fresh blood, often there was only the desire to again play the role of leader that the Torrijos period had granted them. With that door closed, the right medium was formed for the spread of influence, resentment, and right-wing parties, especially among sectors whose professional and economic relations were more linked to the oligarchy and transnational enterprises. In the country's history the middle class has had a sizable role in political upheavals and opinion and in the government's stability, although it has generally been excluded from exercising power (except during the Torrijos period). This is why the right-wing parties and their U.S. advisers tried their best to control this area. They successfully waged this battle at two levels in which the Torrijos leadership has been weak: the press and exploitation of civic-moral issues.

The opposition created a newspaper specialized in attracting a manipulating urban middle class, taking over their topical interests, their language, and their frustrations with modern professional techniques to simulate objectivity. Paradoxically, this opposition press knew how to take advantage of the fact that the revolutinary process had noticeably increased school attendance and diversified the population's information demands. In contrast to this, the progovernment newspapers have continued to have a more popular style, less specific, which does not pay special attention to other groups of readers who have more specific information interests, cultural demands, and political shrewdness, as is the case with the middle class.

The exploitation of civic-moral issues by the right wing and its press has also been paradoxical: first, because the cases that have been criticized have not been a product of the Torrijos process, but of its deformation; second, because the more scandalous cases have generally been carried out by officials associated with the oligarchy and privileged groups who used their Torrijist connections to make money at the government's expense; and third, because the harshest critics of such deformities have always been Torrijist leaders and members themselves. The facts prove that it has been a serious mistake not to have made public those criticisms and not having demanded that corrective measures be taken.

Nevertheless, the main people to receive punishment should be those same people who made COFINA [National Financial Corporation] bankrupt, who owe the national bank and other official enterprises millions, who made their businesses and capital grow by using or cheating the state. These are the same ones who encourage the neocolonial model and a return to prerevolutionary political vices, and who now conspire from their banks, companies, and business associations. The first and main rectification is to make them appear in court.

All the foregoing has had extensive and dangerous repercussions among the youth. Until the 1980's the middle and lower classes had traditional, progressive, and patriotic ideals, which they later abandoned. The motivation that the national liberation process and its nine pending revolutionary tasks afforded, as well as professional prospects that a growing national development and a growing economy with prospects for diversification offered, were lost. The future has become difficult, resulting in misguided discontent after being exposed to reactionary and foreign propaganda.

Fearing youth's critical spirit and combativeness, those who promoted the neocolonial model and reconciliation with the oligarchy and imperialism chose to neutralize them. They tried to divide and dismantle their organizations and even disrupted the organizational role of the INDE [National Sports Institute], the youth brigades, and forums and activities for social work and awareness.

Just as in 1979, when no adequate explanation was given and no steps were taken to readjust the foiled educational reform, no serious efforts were made to politically win back the teachers sector, or at least part of it. The necessary reorganization of the educational system was not addressed. Educational activities were left to the whim and desire of leaders who supplanted the teachers' national mystique with a sordid money-minded and reactionary trade unionism. Thus, public education was permitted to degrade and lose quality, which forced the middle class to move its children to private schools and the poor and the peasants to watch their children receive poor quality education.

The raising of nationalistic banners regarding the year 2000 will not be enough to win back and convince the young people to embrace patriotic causes. The young people who are now allowing themselves to be used to carry out disorders and outrages are the result of a deficient educational system that has been manipulated by retrogressive and foreign-minded sectors that have

distorted their spirit of criticism, weakened their nationalistic spirit, and caused them to become confused and frustrated. If we do not win the young back now with new revolutionary efforts, we risk losing our country's nationality.

2. EXTERNAL FACTORS [subhead]

From its inception, the Reagan administration has pursued a single, definite, and systemmatic policy on Panama. It has combined this policy with pressures; manipulations; diplomatic, financial, and military meddling; political wire-pulling; and manipulation of the news to discredit, isolate, weaken, and destabilize the Torrijist leadership and the national government.

The objective of this has been to reduce the advantages Panama obtained in the canal treaties, to derail and eventually stop the implementation of the treaties, and to keep the military bases here to pursue U.S. hegemonistic and interventionist goals in the region, which go quite beyond what the treaties permit. The U.S. Administration also seeks to undermine, twist, and replace Panama's foreign policy insofar as it concerns Panama's defense of its sovereignty, its neutrality and that of the canal, its mediation to achieve peace through self-determination in Central America, and its strategy concerning Latin American and Third World solidarity.

Proof of it is the approval of Law 96-70 and the refusal to repeal it; the measures to reduce the powers of the canal administrator of Panamanian nationality, who will assume office in 1990; and the persistent pressures to paralyze and end Panama's participation in the efforts of the Contadora Group.

However, this U.S. policy is basically aimed at belittling and eliminating Torrijism as a political, civic, and military example for peoples and armed forces in the region and to physically eliminate Torrijism forever as a government and political option in Panama. This has been demonstrated by the most recent events.

It is ironical that, notwithstanding the special links between Panama and the United States following the shift in 1984, Panama's diplomatic work regarding Washington has been clumsy and incoherent and has lacked professionalism and consistency with our nation's interests. The ability to establish links with U.S. congressmen, lobbyists, media, and academic circles, and to make friends among the democratic sectors and groups that have interests in the region has been lost. The constant turnover of Panamanian ambassadors and the appointment of ambassadors who have lacked diplomatic savoir faire and knowledge about the objectives to be pursued or what strings to pull in U.S. political circles are worth noting. The Panamanian Embassy lacks qualified policy management and the personnel required to perform these priority tasks.

Furthermore, it has been proven and demonstrated repeatedly that the only way to defend and develop our sovereignty, self-determination, and national interests that are confronted by U.S. policies is to diversify and increase our political, economic, and diplomatic foreign relations. However, we have stopped strengthening them and integrating into Latin America and its regional organizations such as the Andean Pact. We have also stopped our cooperation with northern Europe and the European community, Asian countries, and the more industrialized socialist countries, promoted by most of the Latin American countries. The Panamanian presence at the Nonaligned Movement and at international and regional forums and organizations has been neglected. We have allowed the loss of the varied net of relations and solidarities developed by Omar Torrijos. In other words, suspiciously, some of the past Panamanian administrations have themselves facilitated the U.S. objective of limiting our international options and isolating ourselves.

In its place, after Omar Torrijos' death, we have misguidedly attempted to attain the goodwill of the United States by yielding to Reagan's policy. The basic reason for Panama's present political crisis is the accumulation of renunciations of principles and tasks bequeathed by Torrijos and the fact that the enthronement of the present government alliance did not satisfy the Reagan administration's ideological group. It also did not neutralize the ambitions and aggressiveness of the Panamanian oligarchy and right-wing sectors.

In order to speedily attain the U.S. objectives in our country, a plan to destabilize Panama was orchestrated under the operational and strategic direction of the extremist group that has taken over the National Security Council. Through this plan, they want to definitely eliminate all the people responsible for maintaining certain national policies that hamper or contradict Reagan's immediate objectives in the region. We have not met this conservative conception of a formal and dependant democracy, which requires alternating the governing groups; that is, the total abandonment of prior national policies.

However, this extremist group lacked a working alternative to replacing Panamanian officials. Thus, its efforts were directed at dividing the government alliance and the social alliances of Torrijism, the sectors and currents within the party, and the Armed Forces. It endeavored to disperse and neutralize our groups and promote a third option based on managerial, union, and civic groups, or frustrated and resentful individuals. They managed to make an impact mainly in high spheres of the middle class and the executive work force of the service sector. Groups such as COCINA [Coordinating Board for National Civilianization] and MODELO [Local Democratic Movement] were experiments with that goal in sight. They were organized with the direct participation of the U.S. Embassy, and experts were brought in from the Philippines for this purpose. Thus the structuring of

an opposition force was attained, and it was a force that had more capacity for rallying political groups, had working possibilities, and was in accordance with U.S. interests.

This internal and foreign operation's potential developed thanks to a combination of errors and deficiencies made by the governing block since 1984. In its haste to obtain economic relief, the governing bloc improvised agreements that accommodated the requirements of the transnational financial system and that caused Panamanian society serious traumas, giving it little in exchange. An important example was Ardito Barletta's bill for Law 46, which surprised the party and the country and caused the government a serious loss of trust and credibility. After that, the traumas caused to the agricultural, industrial, and labor sectors with the so-called "structural readjustments" accumulated additional frustrations, without achieving an agreement with the financial system because of these actions.

In addition, the pending Social Security Fund threat unleashes disquieting repercussions by merely mentioning it. But what is even more serious is that confronted with all these facts and instead of demonstrating a political will and initiative to create alternatives, the government yielded to the position that took less effort, improvising on-the-spot decisions that accumulated even more political costs.

It was within this context that Colonel Roberto H. Diaz (retired) made his statements. Independently of whether he deliberately acted in connivance with certain organizations or acted on his own initiative, those statements proposed a division within the Armed Forces and a restructuring of the country's political forces, favoring Washington and the oligarchy's pretentions.

Since Gen Paredes' candidacy, Col Diaz was in charge of coordinating political activities. Hence, he handled the criteria for the presidential succession and a substantial part of the relations with the party and its cadres, as well as contacts with local and foreign political personalities. He acquired a political image that gave his statements repercussions that far surpassed the limitations of his personality, affecting the cadres of Torrijism and related currents inside the country and abroad.

The Reaganist nucleus and its native associates thought that this was the moment to push for a total change, through quick action that would enable them to achieve their objectives regarding the canal, military bases, Panama's alignment in Central America, and the delivery of the country's administration to the oligarchy and political right. The plans for that sudden attack [golpe de mano] were prepared in advance, as well as the task force that has been directing the actions. However, in order to have a political justification for the changes, they used the ADO [Democratic Opposition Alliance] parties, leading them to issue a practically insurrectional declaration. When it became evident that the parties' call had received little support and contradictions emerged within ADO, the actions were laid upon the civic and economic groups—with whom they had been working for some years—now grouped in the so-called Civic Crusade, although the latter is incapable of offering a national alternative to the nation.

In their haste and subsequent obstinacy, they committed serious mistakes in evaluating General Manuel Antonio Noriega's personality and the role of the members of the General Staff and officers. They also underestimated the resistance capacity of the Torrijist political culture, which is deeply rooted in broad sectors of the population—particularly in peoples organizations, in the party's mid-level groups, and in progressive political personalities, who have presented a resistance that has surpassed all expectations.

There is no reason to believe in the alleged "democratic" intentions of this seditious movement, scarcely 1 and 1/2 years from general elections in the country and with the opening of opportunities to perfect electoral norms and procedures. With this "democratic" pretext unmasked, they obstinately persist in their attempts to overthrow not only a man, but the entire constitutional government, and attack all its members using increasingly fascist methods.

This haste continues with a high cost, because the mentors of the movement do not respond to national interests and the damage caused to the national and popular economy hardly affects them. They obstinately want to achieve their goals now, because the posibility of a constitutional change of government would force them to wait until 1989, which would be too late for the Reagan administration, and therefore also too late for those who would take over the government under their protection.

However, although very few remember Roberto Diaz, his statements brought to the surface deficiencies accumulated in the conduct of the Torrijist process in the past few years, in addition to the extended social discontent disclosed by the current events. It has become evident that after Ardito Barletta's resignation, a simplistic method was followed in handling the government. The governmental alliance is currently exhausted; the government lacks political direction and initiative to generate new alternatives. Months have passed in trying to find a consensus to meet the new realities. In practice, the party is not fulfilling its role of promoting unity within its sectors and mass organizations, its ministers, legislators, and top government officials. Orders and counterorders abound, and the ability to convoke the masses that Torrijism still maintains is not used properly; the people are called to activities having no importance or continuity.

In addition, vital discussions with multinational financial organizations are pending and no options for renegotiation within the current scheme have been planned.

In view of a financial gap [brecha] of 350 million balboas and the possibility of having to dismiss 30,000 government employees, a political debate in the Cabinet Council is months overdue. Actions are not based on a national economic policy. We are merely reacting to IMF requirements. The plans on what should be done in the reverted areas has not been discussed or implemented. We have not exploited the economic options offered by developed countries in other regions of the world. We are not participating in the Latin American debate on the alternatives to facing debt and development.

We are involved in a very serious crisis, which has taken on the characteristics of a harsh rebellion against all representatives of Torrijism, particularly in the metropolitan area. Yet, there is a notable lack of political leadership and an absence of a proposal to offer to society as an option in the present circumstances, which are obviously not the same as 10 years ago. This contributes to the relative paralysis of the government. In contrast, the enemy is operating with a plan designed to undermine the national instincts, disregard canal and military pacts, destroy the country's self-determination, eliminate our neutrality in order to make us subordinates, and bankrupt the international banking center and the national economy. It is doing the same thing in other countries in the region. Each people has to decide how to stop this offensive by the oligarchies and imperialism, which should be confronted in solidarity. Our country has to do its part.

So far, everything possible has been tried in an attempt to reach an understanding with those enemies, even to the point of relinquishing some Torrijist methods and achievements. However, they do not want an agreement; they want the total and definitive elimination of the Torrijist experience and all its representatives. It can be seen that nothing is gained through this policy of concessions, except to disgust and discourage our people, which leads to an even greater weakening of the government and the party.

3. Political Leadership Factors [subhead]

As an alternative, there is talk of undertaking corrective changes in our government policy and party actions. These corrections are interpreted in different ways by the various sectors and groups. However, it is not clear what changes are really necessary and what path should be followed. Instead, the peoples movement, CONATO [National Council of Organized Workers], and the government employees have been placed in a state of suspense, but no agreement has been reached with them about the definition, feasibility, and implementation of these corrections. Thus, the party could find itself facing discrepant plans made by these forces.

The party has a great responsibility in this. It is necessary to determine why it has failed to meet this responsibility and what must be done for the party to fulfill its mission. After all, although the president is not from our ranks, most of the ministers, heads of institutions, legislators, mayors, and representatives are.

It is necessary to reconsider the type of party we have: its internal organization, the participation of its groups and sectors in the making and implementation of decisions, and its concepts and mechanisms of consultation and coordination with its main allies and other related sectors.

Similarly, we have to identify more specifically what groups and social sectors of the Panamanian nation the party represents and what interests, language, and proposals they make and demand. Then we have to act accordingly, because only thus will we be able to recover the party's drawing power and potential.

For practical reasons it is necessary to recall that Torrijism emerged in the 1970's as a contemporary expression of the Panamanian people's movement, the same movement that had carried out the national exploits of 1947, 1958, and 1964, among others. Therefore, it is above all a movement of national liberation. Consequently, the party emerged with great drawing power because it was the social structure charged with organizing the social movement, channeling the participation of its representatives, and guiding the actions of the masses in the direction necessary to meet the movement's objectives.

Despite repeated periods of actually being without leadership, the party has been and continues to be strong in the measure that it politically expresses that historic and social heritage. However, if the party should dissociate itself from the demands of that social group there remains only an empty outline, and the groups that comprise the party will disperse or seek their objectives through other means, whether appropriate or not. To keep them together it is necessary to propose to them new goals of national liberation, in line with the pending changes and the new realities, and allow them to participate in the pursuit of those goals. It is not enough to recall and exalt the goals that have already been met or to express hopes that later are not translated into feasible tasks.

At the same time, because of the nature of the national challenges of the 1970's, the party did not emerge as a structured, homogeneous organization, but as a movement, in other words, as a social front united by the goals that the national liberation process was pursuing at the time. Consequently, it was not born as the party of the workers, or the businessmen, or of any sector of the middle class; but rather as the convergence of the common interests of a broad variety of social sectors and groups; in other words, it is a multiclass conglomerate for a single national plan.

This poses a problem of organization, of equilibrium in the participation of the various forces that make decisions, and, therefore, of an (individual or collegiate)

leadership that must always be representative of this equilibrium. After 1978, once the goals of that period were accomplished, other goals remained. Reaching those goals was, and still is, necessary to safeguard and develop the Torrijist model. Consequently, it was necessary to identify which forces and people were interested in facing this and who would be in charge of leading the new phase. This points out the importance of paying adequate attention to the various sectoral and mass fronts that comprise the party and to the various tendencies that exist in it.

At the beginning, the main organizing effort was dedicated to the creation of nuclei in the neighborhoods where party members lived and on the territorial organization of the party. Before 1983, this program apparently was the most suitable for acting through local and community juntas; for structuring the people's power, which was based on the Corregimiento representatives system; and for the local organization of voters to lead them to the polls. However, this is not the appropriate method for making viable an agreement among the social sectors and tendencies that compose the party at the moment of evaluating new situations, goals, and tasks at the national level, and of agreeing on doctrinary statements.

An organizational system based on the territorial aspect, which is necessary and adequate for some goals, was used to integrate the party's Political Commission. This commission, which must be comprised of the political intellectuals of the various party currents and sectors so they may jointly analyze the circumstances and alternatives of the general political process, was limited to pointing out local concerns and demands (something that the provincial and zonal leadership should do). In addition, the specific function of the political commission—an organ that should decide on guidelines to be followed by the party—was ignored.

To compensate for this, the party tried to represent the various sectors and currents in CEN, where the desired common agreement was reduced to a few interpersonal relations. This way it was ignored that CEN's role is to act as an operational direction team and to represent the line adopted by the multisection aggregate of the party, and not the line of any particular section.

The lack of facilities for working out programatic agreements among the currents and for elaborating tasks that could be tackled jointly promoted competititon among the groups and people who wanted to occupy positions within the formal structures of the party (such as the secretariats). For this reason, these structures have faced limitations for adequately fulfilling their tasks. This has led to an unjustified increase in the number of positions; but in practice many of them have stopped having any real function and their roles have been downgraded. There should not be more secretariats than are necessary to fulfill the operational functions of CEN, and they should act as the executive arms of CEN, just as the party statutes establish and as they were originally conceived.

Efforts have been made to compensate for the lack of representation, analytical deficiencies, failure to produce multisection agreements within the political commission, CEN's lack of contact, and the secretariat's lack of effectiveness by convoking "expanded" meetings or assemblies with the indiscriminate participation of many cadres and militants. These meetings, however, do not satisfy the needs for specialized analyses and agreements and instead stir up oratory tournaments of useless political consequences.

Events have demonstrated that, excluding elections, the Panamanian people are inclined to express their political objectives through trade unions and civic and professional organizations rather than through parties. This emphasizes the importance of making sure that the party's sectoral fronts, under a single political leadership, insert themselves into and speak out within these social organizations. That is, the party should put special interest in its secretariats and fronts directed at working within such organizations to exert an influence in their direction.

When an effort was finally made to make the debate within the party's sectoral fronts dynamic, the evolution of the social situation had changed. The action came late. The social organizations already were involved in their own dynamics, with no party orientation, and often in open conflict with the party. The modest results obtained from the creation of nuclei and the territorial organization have been of little help in facing the current situation because neighbors do not organize themselves as such but according to their occupational and ideological affinities.

This experience has dramatically shown that it is indispensable that the party be led according to its statutes and its principles and toward the implementation of its program. Casting aside its principles and its program as the guide for the party's stances and actions has had and is having high social and political consequences for the Torrijist process and the country. The chronic disregard for the statutes, regulations, and agreements as guides for its organization and operations has resulted in excessive ineffectiveness. The failure to count on the National Directorate on time, the failure to count on the Political Commission whenever needed, and the failure to count on the contributions by the special commissions and the coordination by the fronts has caused a failure to foresee developments, inability and delay in assessing them, and, therefore, improvisations and lack of participation by the cadres in facing them.

Experience has also shown that we must review our organizational charts and operating guidelines to make them more representative and functional regarding a

changing situation and more appropriate in implementing and enforcing the party's program and objectives, and facing situations such as the current one.

It must be said that when the current crisis erupted the party had already begun a process of reorganization. Its structure is in a transitional phase; therefore, some areas have renewed leaders who have handled the situation well, whereas others still have worn-out leaders. This necessary reorganization is still affected by delays and distortions in the process of forming the nuclei, especially in the urban areas. Regrettably, some party members who hold local posts have tried to handle this process based on their private interests and not the loftier need to collectively and democratically regroup all the Torrijist forces. Such distorted and sectarian forms of local organization cannot be accepted or allowed to affect the party's overall and local decisions.

It is up to the party's deliberative branch to decide as soon as possible what the goals and priorities are, toward which it must orient its actions. It is time to discuss and define the party's strategy for social and political alliances; that is, what alliances do we want and toward what goal. It is necessary to create a renewed social front with the people's organizations and sectors interested in a renewal with fresh objectives and definitions in the process of national liberation. Together with them, a policy and action program must be established that would go beyond the crisis and reflect the interest and aspirations of the specific social majorities that one intends to guide.

In sum, it is necessary that the party be able to meet these demands, generate from within strategic and operational decisions of this sort, and foster their organization and implementation. The party also must be able to decide on its own so it can quickly issue the political instructions that its members need and to assign missions and tasks to its organizations and members without "blackouts," ambiguities, and counterorders. It must be a party capable of proposing and enforcing the changes needed now and of promoting and rallying the support of the social sectors that it represents. It must be a party that consults and coordinates matters with its allies and other groups as the case may be. It also must be capable of processing and implementing its own decisions, coordinating the support of its allies, and following up the corresponding tasks.

Although the party is relatively new, many of its leaders and cadres have long and vast experience and political training. To group members in this category implies recognizing their autonomous capacity to prepare, program, and implement political decisions. Both the present crisis situation and future circumstances demand that vast confidence and support be shown for their capability in order to make use of them. This calls for immediately overcoming the concept viewing the party as a passive or dependent front that must await orientations or requests from official directives.

On the contrary, it is expected that each one of the regional or sector organizations of the party will produce and promote their own initiatives, within the general guidelines of the party's national leadership. This supreme leadership must determine with the leaders of the various forces or allied organizations the common objectives and general line of action to be followed. It must maintain fluid communications with them for coordination and to follow-up. But the party must generate the corresponding activities, preserving its own leadership role to fulfill its purpose, from CEN to the local and sector organizations.

Internal debate in the party should give rise to initiatives and decisions as well as members' promotions. The latter should be executed on the basis of personal merit. Changes in the party's leadership should result from the exercise of democracy within the party in accordance with the party's statutes and regulations. The same is true for determining priorities and taking actions in accordance with the party's realities, objectives, principles, and program. Naturally, all this will be carried out by reporting to or consulting both allies and friends, with whom it is necessary to preserve unity of thought and action at the proper levels and whenever suitable.

This involves remembering that decisions or changes made outside the party's natural structure are sometimes foreign to the party's internal realities and dynamics. This weakens the consultation and leadership structures and lowers the quality of fulfillment.

What we have been discussing also applies to the selection of candidates for election posts as well as those positions filled by executive branch appointment. There has been a tendency to select people who are "suitable" from the viewpoint of specific officials or as the result of personal relations. This results in candidates who lack the necessary leadership and importance in the party or who cannot properly represent the party and Torrijism politically. The practice we have mentioned weakens a correct relationship between those people and the party. This, in turn, lowers their political responsibilities. In addition, those candidates must obey instructions from an administration they did not choose and that the party's membership does not support. When we deal with election positions, the responsibilities and actions of these candidates can no longer be directed politically.

Another essential aspect to ensure the party's efficiency and its ability to operate is the party's need to have its own resources for its normal activities. The party becomes less efficient if it must seek the necessary resources for every project. Such resources cannot always be obtained. The party must develop its own sources of revenue, which include obligatory dues from ministers, directors of institutions, legislators, mayors, and top officials; the self-financing of the party's elements; the voluntary dues of the members; and, particularly, the management of profitable enterprises for this specific

purpose. Furthermore, the activities of fronts and secretariats should be carried out with budget allocations supervised by the higher leaders.

We conclude from all this that it is necessary to hold a new party congress as soon as possible. However, the party's organizational process should not be limited to formal acts or stages but should constitute a broad process of movement and debate and distribution of missions and tasks. In the process, the party's leaders and active members should note the causes for and the factors of the current situation, make decisions concerning the forms of involvement to improve this situation, and take the necessary steps to resume with new energy the national liberation process by enforcing the party's principles and program whereby we are defined as Torrijists.

4. Democratization and Development [subhead]

All that we have mentioned also entails establishing the state and democracy model that the party is to propose to Panamanian society. This proposal must meet at least two conditions: it should improve aspects of the traditional democracy model that have been causing so much trouble; and it should recover and improve upon the local mechanisms of the people's representation and participation experienced during the past decade, orienting them properly to give new impetus to the national liberation process through a broad democratic process.

We must make deep corrections. This entails recovering the participating and pluralist role of the people in the revolutionary model and the latter's broad social and territorial application. This does not mean, however, that we must break with all that sprang from the 1983 constitutional amendments. On the contrary, we should keep whatever proved useful so we can improve on the defects of the 1972 model and update it according to the new circumstances. We should also create the necessary original mechanisms to give this model the stability and efficiency that national interests require.

All this also means to perfect and update the economic model proposed by Torrijists. Of necessity, this model is closely linked to a state and democracy model. The economic model and the national development strategy as outlined in the party's program are still valid and constitute the core of our proposal. This model only needs to be completed to allow it to tackle the new phenomena and problems that have arisen during the past few years. Regarding this, it would be admitted that the Torrijist economic model made possible the greatest success and progress of the Panamanian economy. Thanks to the application of this model, the national economy was strengthened and diversified, integrating into progress large social and territorial areas that had been so far abandoned.

Nevertheless, the continuation of this model was abandoned and the model was dismantled before producing all the results, while it still had much to offer. This makes it necessary to reconsider the so-called reforms" [quotation marks as published] implemented since 1982 to replace this model, particularly the plan that Ardito Barletta and the negotiations with the World Bank imposed on it. The counterrevolutionary economic strategy with which some have tried to replace the Torrijist model is precisely what has been causing damage to the Panamanian economy for the benefit of the oligarchy and the speculators, and to the detriment of the producers, the middle class, and the popular sectors.

The national economy should also be democratized. We do not want an economic model to implement "reforms" to the liking of the transnational and oligarch's financial authorities; who want a model to advance and generate prosperity for the largest popular sectors. This demands that we protect, improve, and continue using in the best manner what we have, in order to obtain more dividends.

We should not destroy the entire model; we should instead readjust the points that have not provided good results, because what is dismantled will never result in benefits. The recipients of the economy are the people, and not the profits; thus there should always be a favorable evaluation of the social, political, and other intangible benefits.

The Torrijist model is not one of populism or paternalism. Torrijism is not the irrational and indiscriminate distribution of gifts or the satisfaction of any kind of vindication without considering the overall possibilities and priorities. Torrijism is a combination of a variety of elements—small or large, national or international, state-owned, private, mixed, or social property—incorporated into the production and growth of the sectors that have been left out of the joint economic effort and its benefits.

Torrijism is the combination of all the productive forces, together with a democratization of the mechanisms of access to the economy: credits, technical education, capital, appropriate advice, etc.; and the protection and improvement of the already existing productive enterprises. It is also the democratization of decisions concerning the economy, through debates and consultations, and the democratization of the benefits resulting from the economy, by reinvesting and expanding social services.

The Torrijist model and its applications have proven to be able to function even when the financial resources are scarce. Under the present circumstances in Latin America and throughout the world those resources will be scarce whether we maintain the model or whether we dismantle it, and the resources will be scarce for this model or for any other model. Under the circumstances prevailing in the international economy the Torrijist

model should be consolidated and should be better implemented. When the Torrijist model was implemented, the state and social sectors of the economy grew rapidly, but the already existing administrative structures were left behind. It is necessary to reconsider and to update these structures and the structures in public administration in order to guarantee the efficiency of this model.

The main reason for the lack of resources is the exaggerated and merciless burden of the foreign debt service on state finances. This overwhelming extraction of resources is the main cause of the damage to the economy, which today means restriction of projects and state services and social discontent. It is necessary to determine the criteria according to which we will take short-term actions to qualify and restrict debt payments. It is necessary to establish the method through which Panama, according to the characteristics of its economy, will take into account the best experiences in the Latin American debate on this matter and to then adopt its own criteria to condition the payments to the results of our national development plans. The payments should be made as allowed by the plan, based on national priorities and not the opposite, which is now occurring.

Moreover, Panama should actively join the Latin American debate on handling the regional economic crisis, jointly facing the conditions for paying the debt, as well as the cooperation and integration among our countries.

The party should demand the design of an organized national development policy, according to which all the government's attitudes and actions will be regulated. Furthermore, the party demands the democratization of the debate on the situation and the alternatives to the national economy. It is unacceptable that this matter remains as a monopoly of the technicians, because this is a drama for all Panamanians. The party also demands a national debate on the reality and the alternatives for the use of the areas reverted to Panama, which is a matter of immediate interest of all citizens.

Finally, it is absolutely necessary to multiply the effort to diversify and multiply the international economic relations of the country. Panama is not taking full advantage of important opportunities for economic cooperation with the EEC, northern Europe, Asia, the socialist countries, Canada, and the Latin American region. This demands a reconsideration of the structure and duties of the institutions handling the country's diplomatic and economic relations, which are not fulfilling these fundamental objectives. An aggressive political and diplomatic action should be started as soon as possible in the mentioned regions and countries, as well as at the organizations and multilateral forums for this purpose.

5. Immediate Rectification [subhead]

Aside from all these considerations—which are indispensable to understanding the situation and correcting the course for the short, medium, and long term—it is necessary to provide the mechanisms for coordination and action to direct the most immediate actions, to control this crisis as quickly as possible. The present party leadership structure is capable of making decisive contributions for this purpose, but still cannot assume all the aspects of responsibility.

To do this, we must establish a high-level ad-hoc political directorate invested with the greatest authority to centrally plan and coordinate the actions of all pro-Torrijos forces, allies, or sympathizers, and the popular and patriotic organizations to demand or fulfill the measures of confrontation or corrections that may be necessary—in the streets, or before the government and the Legislative Assembly, or before other entities or sectors that may be necessary.

Meanwhile, there is a group of measures to provide an important breathing spell for the immediate economic situation and to unblock the present government paralysis on the pending negotiations, demonstrating that it is possible to act creatively. These are:

1. Establish legislation or mechanisms to provide special insurance to protect individuals funds deposited in savings accounts of Panamanian banks, to strengthen the system and provide greater guarantees for depositors. The purpose of this is to return to the local banks the money taken out of the country as a result of the recent political conspiracy.

2. Promote the construction of housing with the secondary mortgage market or mortgage bonds, to encourage the participation of insurance companies.

3. Respect the negotiation of the debt:

a. Negotiate only on the basis of the real capacity to pay.

b. Resolve the problem of the Social Security Fund by obtaining greater benefits from the reserves; strengthen its assets and other income (subsidies for the integrated health and special retirement system).

c. Negotiate for the return of the interest on loans for investments and development.

The present crisis demands that we proceed to make corrective changes, and a substantial part is the change of people and personal attitudes. There is an emergency and confrontational situation at present. It is not sufficient to have "portable" officials who have good intentions or are good technicians. It is imperative to have leaders during this time of crisis who are knowledgeable and have political vivacity, teamwork habits, and fighting morale. They must be capable of making decisions and assuming the necessary responsibilities and risks. Therefore, they must be selected from within the party so

they will be guaranteed the political backing necessary for the full compliance of their missions. Only this type of cadre can draft the remaining changes required, by affecting whatever interests and customs that must be affected.

The amplitude and depth of this crisis makes it impossible to resolve it solely through cloaked or half-hearted measures. This only increases the frustrations and prolongs the damage caused by the situation. It demands more drastic corrections than the measures adopted so far, which are superficial and lack the necessary effect. To obtain an initial breathing spell, it is indispensable to consider the repeal of three structural readjustment laws in the agricultural, industrial, and labor sectors, which are imposing high social and political costs without providing the desired economic effects.

It is also necessary to legislate to give more space, rights, and importance to the people's power, to improve electoral structures and laws to democratize the internal life of the parties, and to facilitate the registration of peoples parties to increase the autonomy and efficiency of the judicial branch and the Attorney General's Office. In the economic sector, the prices on the 14 staples not produced in the country, including oil by-products, should be substantially reduced (in the case of the oil by-products, by eliminating inefficiency at the Panama refinery). It is necessary to eliminate as soon as possible inefficiency in the commercial sector by allowing free competition in the marketing of imported products. The bill on the reverted areas and the new bill on the education sector must be approved soon. The bill on administrative careers must be in line with feasible possibilities and guarantee stability and progress to the employees as well as quality work and efficiency from them.

It is necessary to broadly internationalize the diplomatic and political efforts being made to demand the derogation of Law 96-70 and to turn these efforts into a collective claim of all the Latin Americans at all forums and multinational organizations. At the same time, it is necessary to systematically provide political information to U.S. congressional, civic, and news sectors to inform them about the true nature of that law and to make the political sectors and the media of the industrialized countries that are allies of the United States aware of this law.

In addition, it is necessary to alert everyone about the importance of the changes that will take place in 1990, when a Panamanian administrator will take control of the canal, and about our just and unyielding determination that this administrator must function with full attributes and in line with national interests. Everyone must also be made aware of the danger that the U.S.desire to reduce the attributes of the Panamanian administrator represents for Panama, Latin America, and the world's commercial and shipping community.

It must be realized that our actions and changes will generate medium-term effects and the crisis that already exists must meanwhile be faced. Besides, it is necessary to know how "to sell" these measures so they are promptly accepted and supported and to guarantee the effects that popular backing produces. To guarantee this, it is necessary to improve the progovernment newspapers and all the other media that have an affinity with Torrijism. It would be good to ensure that the media with affinity with Torrijism have high-quality political orientation. It is also necessary to promote a sectoral differentiation of the newspapers to develop one capable of exerting influence on the middle class. At the same time, it is necessary to secure adequate political and psychological leadership for the progovernment and party propaganda aggregates.

It is also necessary to create a central entity aimed at continuously giving the best political attention to the foreign media accredited to Panama and to journalists who visit Panama on special assignments.

The Political Directorate should be able to selectively issue invitations to journalists to visit the country and establish and review agreements with foreign news agencies. This was not foreseen, and the opposition has been able to misinform and arbitrarily manipulate international public opinion. It is also necessary to aggressively activate Panalpress and Panama's participation in multinational Latin American and nonaligned press agencies.

The extent and level of danger of the crisis should not be underestimated. We must not believe that the problem will be resolved once the current situation is under control. The problem will arise again with increased aggressiveness and strength as long as the factors that created it prevail, including U.S. inteference. The enemy has exalted and firmly established fascist methods that clearly imitate those used for many months against Salvador Allende's administration in Chile until a massacre ensued.

Consequently, the situation demands "major surgery" procedures. Empty promises and specific demands cannot be made until the overall situation and the real outlook are taken into consideration. Changes in government and its policy must be much more substantial than this. The country cannot be governed by accepting the traditional rules of formal democracy that are demanded by the enemy or by progressively reaching agreements for an alleged national reconciliation.

The enemy does not seek a settlement; the enemy wants everything, and wants to definitely abolish Torrijism as the country's political alternative. Nevertheless, the country still demands deep changes to attain the liberation of our nation and people, and thus give our children the future they deserve, instead of being annulled as a

nation. Hence the enormous and dramatic meaning of the phrase issued by Manuel Antonio Noriega as an appeal or warning: In 1989, people's liberation or slavery!

This dilemma demands a clear awareness of our goals and specific possibilities. The alternative for the party and Torrijism is to safeguard our national stability, increasing our rectification to win the 1989 elections with the people's support. This will be attained by adequately coordinating the party's goals and actions with the allies that support our national liberation program.

Nevertheless, we have a responsibility and a national program to fulfill; otherwise, the nation itself, and the people's right to self-respect and liberty, will be endangered. It is necessary to administer the state until the program is completed and the people's participation is increased in the most appropriate and democratic way. The goal will not be attained with a quota of power that is limited to the current conditions, which are impractical and tend to worsen. Quite the contrary, the national liberation process must be renewed. It is necessary to reorganize the government, rebuild its structures, change the situation, adopt the necessary measures without being indulgent, and counter the U.S. reactions.

All this must be done without relinquishing the organization levels that have been attained by the party, the people's power, the people's organizations, and the labor organizations. The necessary alliance of forces already exists; only certain figures have become worn out. There is an alliance between the party, workers, intellectuals, progressive people, national businessmen, and the Panama Defense Forces. A deep change must be accompanied by a model of organization and civil participation that outlines the changes and responsibilities as the most visible part of the renewed liberation process.

Argentina

Economic Measures, Alfonsin Speech Viewed

Cafiero Cited

PY151508 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 0215 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 14 Oct (NA)—Buenos Aires Province Governor-elect Antonio Cafiero stated tonight that the economic measures defended by President Raul Alfonsin in his speech "do not solve structural problems," and that the adjustment proposed by the government "will fall upon the poorest sectors." He admitted, however, that he listened "attentively" to the call for a sociopolitical agreement made by the president.

Cafiero added that the anti-inflationary program "does not solve structural problems that keeps provoking the serious socioeconomic crisis in the country. This program also calls for a new adjustment which will fall upon the poorest sectors."

Referring to the social agreement proposed by the president, the governor-elect stated that the Peronist Party "has listened carefully and with interest to the call for an agreement, because this has been one of the banners we have raised over the past few years."

He added that this agreement "must not be carried out to achieve the support of the other social and political sectors for government proposals, but so that we all may be able to devise a new economic model that will, on the one hand, permit us to overcome the stagnation crisis and, on the other hand, to help the poorest sectors."

He concluded by saying that "we will have to wait a few days to see the concrete results of these measures, to see how prices look as compared to salaries and the rate of inflation. But many of us fear that this new adjustment will fall upon those who traditionally have paid for the consequences of past errors."

Tariff Increases Criticized

PY151201 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2340 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 14 Oct (NA)—The CGT [General Confederation of Labor] tonight criticized "the new wave of tariff increases," and the "provoked increase of prices of staples." The CGT also reiterated its determination "to develop a plan of protests."

The position of the CGT was made clear through a communique in which it questions the latest government economic measures "that were presented as a fait accompli to labor, social, and political organizations which were not able to comment before their implementation."

The communique says that "at no time has the CGT agreed to or accepted any socioeconomic plan not previously submitted for its consideration. The CGT has, however, submitted to the government its own set of demands."

The CGT vindicates the decisions regarding "the defense of workers rights and the methods to implement them," and adds that "the different CGT departments will decide on the strategies to implement its decisions."

The document says that "the only thing we ask from all social and political sectors is their solidarity and understanding in our struggle which, over the years, has been the only obstacle in the way of the enemies of the happiness of the people, and the greatness of the nation."

Protest, Riots at YPF International Bidding

PY151217 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1747 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 14 Oct (NA)—The biddings today of the third international public competition for the prospecting and explotation of oil reserves in 30 different areas of the country was interrupted by some 150 Government Oil Deposit (YPF) employees who walked into the YPF headquarters, threw objects at the participants, and shouted "thieves, thieves."

The YPF employees convened by two labor unions were protesting against the policy of granting hydrocarbon exploitation concessions to the private sector, particularly in 2 of the 30 areas.

The ceremony was interrupted some 10 minutes after it started and was resumed only at 1345, after the YPF employees decided to suspend their demonstration because they were of the view that their "objective was fulfilled," and that "people now know what we are against."

At 1000 today, a large number of officials and businessmen from several national and multinational companies gathered in the General Belgrano auditorium, located on the 13th floor of the YPF headquarters, to attend the biddings of the third international competition carried out within the framework of Plan Houston II.

Energy Secretary Jorge Lapena, president of the YPF, was to preside over the meeting but he was not able to enter because of the large number of employees crowding the corridors of the 13th floor shouting and yelling insults against him and against Juan Colombetti, YPF executive vice president, for the "shady deals" that were about to be arranged.

The ceremony of the opening of envelopes started all the same with the officials present, but had to be interrupted after the opening of barely half a dozen envelopes because the demonstrators started throwing water, soap and other objects into the auditorium.

YPF authorities immediately asked the police to intervene. The police, together with the usual building security personnel, cordoned off the entrance of the auditorium, separating participants from the demonstrators, who remained in the area all the same, completely surrounding the auditorium.

An hour after the incident began, a labor union source said that Lapena was meeting with Juan Carlos Crespi, secretary of the light-blue ticket, and other labor union leaders in an attempt to resolve the conflict.

The version was not officially confirmed by YPF authorities. Meawhile, the people inside the auditorium waited in a climate of uncertainty as to whether the ceremony would resume or not.

YPF officials and many other businessmen, including Alejandro Bulgheroni, president of BRIDAS [expansion unknown]; Ricardo Gruneisen, from ASTRA [expansion unknown]; and Oscar Vicente, from Perez Companc, remained besieged inside the auditorium.

At noon the conflict heated up when "Gammexane" [insecticide] capsules were thrown into the vents leading to the auditorium. They spilled inside and produced great confusion because people in the auditorium tried to leave.

A labor union source added that personnel of YPF offices in Neuquen "had stopped work in support of the demonstration here."

The areas of Huantraico and Chihuidos are located in Neuquen Province and are considered "good risk" areas in today's bidding. This was the detonator of the workers' protest.

Workers questioned the decision through a communique released by the labor association called the "garnet ticket" on the grounds that these areas "are immediately south" of the geological structure called the "purple vein" where a large pool of oil was recently discovered.

Labor union sources stressed that a single well in the purple vein produces 400 cubic meters of oil per day, which is 20 times more than the average production in the rest of the country.

The sources added that after the YPF discovery there, "carried out in spite of budget limitations and shortage of equipment," the enterprise started to receive a real "shower" of offers for prospecting in bordering areas.

The sources said that "this is confirmation that private oil companies only invest in exploration when the risk is nonexistent."

Meanwhile the Petroleum Renewal Movement released a communique stressing that "YPF workers find themselves to be at a most critical moment" because of the appointment of Rodolfo Terragno as public works and services minister and Jorge Lapena as YPF president.

The labor association concludes by saying that authorities are doing "great damage to the country" by "surrendering" to private companies the oil reserve areas where no economic risk exist." [quotation mark as received]

Bomb Attack Allegedly Linked to Army Unrest
PY131802 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 0236 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 12 Oct (DYN)—A medium-sized bomb seriously damaged the home of Colonel Alberto L. Borla's father tonight. Military analysts believe that the incident is linked to the delicate situation prevailing within the Army. Colonel Borla has been proposed for promotion to the rank of general and as future Army attorney general.

The explosion did not cause any casualties but seriously damaged the building facade.

The police only confirmed the explosion, refusing to say what caused it, while firemen initially talked about a possible gas leak at the Borla family home, located on the corner of 11 de Setiembre and Sarmiento Streets, in the residential neighborhood of San Fernando in northern Buenos Aires.

However, police sources have confirmed being aware of an anonymous phone call, allegedly made to a sector of the media, by the authors of the alleged attack, claiming responsibility for it.

According to the anonymous caller, the bombing was in response to the "legalist" stance advocated by Borla within the Army.

Recently, high-ranking Army officers have been the targets of threats or intimidation as a direct result of the internal confrontations among these cadres.

A few months ago the police managed to neutralize a bomb in San Vicente neighborhood. The bomb had been planted in the residence of General Elbio Santarrosa who at that time was Army institutional affairs director, but who has subsequently retired.

Recently, Colonel Alberto Borla was recommended for promotion to the rank of general to replace General Raul Ramayo as Army attorney general. Ramayo retired at the same time as Santarrosa.

The retirement of the two high-ranking officers was linked to the consequences of the Easter weekend incidents—last April—which resulted in the dismissal of about a dozen generals.

So far Borla was Ramayo's second but after the latter's retirement Borla became acting attorney general, awaiting his confirmation in the post once the list of proposed promotions is approved by the Senate.

Further on Incident

PY132038 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1604 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 13 Oct (TELAM)—Buenos Aires Province police this morning confirmed that the explosion last night at the house located at 1125 Sarmiento Street, San Fernando, Buenos Aires Province, was caused by a bomb. The explosion caused some damage, but there were no victims.

The First Police Precinct of San Fernando, which has jurisdiction over the area where the explosion occurred, has announced that the investigation of the explosion revealed that the bomb was manufactured with approximately 1 kg of TNT.

The explosion occurred just before 2100 last night in front of the house. Rosa Teresa Sambucetti de Borla, 91, who lives there with her husband, was not injured.

Three fire units from San Fernando turned up, but since there was no fire and no serious damage, two of the units withdrew. The remaining unit remained to carry out the appropriate investigation.

The people who live in the house are the parents of Colonel Borla, who currently holds the post of Army Auditor General. The executive branch has proposed to the Senate that Borla be promoted to general.

Judge Marotto of the San Isidro Courts is in charge of the case.

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Arrives for Visit

PY120112 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2326 GMT 11 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 11 Oct (NA)—PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen arrived in Buenos Aires at noon today heading a delegation that will pay an official 4-day visit to Argentina. Upon his arrival, he was welcomed by his Argentine colleague, Foreign Ministry Secretary Susana Ruiz Cerrutti.

The objective of the visit of the high-ranking PRC official, who is accompanied by experts in Latin American issues, is to (?increase) ties with the objective of reactivating (?bilateral trade) [words indistinct] favorable to Argentina.

Zhu Qizhen, a 60-year-old career diplomat who is visiting Argentina for the second time, will hold a meeting on 14 October at the Olivos presidential residence with President Raul Alfosnin and Foreign Minister Dante Caputo.

Zhu Qizhen will meet on 15 October, the last day of his visit, in Buenos Aires with Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias [words indistinct] bilateral relations.

Further on Activities

PY142014 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 2309 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 13 Oct (TELAM)—PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhu Qizhen tomorrow will greet President Raul Alfonsin—in a place yet to be confirmed—and then will meet with Foreign Minister Dante Caputo.

The PRC vice minister began his activities at 1030 this morning at San Martin Plaza, where he placed a wreath at the foot of the San Martin monument.

Later, Zhu Qizhen, accompanied by his advisers and PRC ambassador to Argentina Shen Yunao, met at the Foreign Ministry with Susana Ruiz Cerrutti, secretary of the Foreign Ministry International Affairs Department.

Zhu Qizhen, who arrived in Argentina accompanied by the chiefs of the PRC Foreign Ministry Americas and Oceania departments and an interpreter, discussed with his Argentine counterpart the possibilities of increasing trade between the two countries.

Meets With Alfonsin

PY152004 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 0034 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 14 oct (DYN)—PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen today invited President Raul Alfonsin to observe personally in Vietnam the withdrawal of troops from the region and the demilitarization of this region of conflict in Southeast Asia.

Today—Zhu Qizhen's next to last day in Argentina—he continued to analyze with Argentine Foreign Ministry officials the possibilities for balancing trade between the two countries. Last year's imbalance amounted to some $350 million.

Zhu Qizhen, who arrived in Argentina with a small entourage on 11 October, has also met with Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias here to study the possibilities of resuming diplomatic relations with Uruguay.

According to Casa Rosada [Government House] sources, President Alfonsin and Zhu Qizhen held a meeting at the Olivos residence, where they discussed the state of their relations, the armed conflicts that threaten world peace, the situation in Southeast Asia, and PRC-U.S. relations.

When examining the situation in Southeast Asia, the PRC vice minister invited President Alfonsin, to observe personally in Vietnam the withdrawal of PRC troops from the region.

Foreign Relations Secretary Susana Ruiz Cerrutti, Foreign Policy Under Secretary Federico Mahurat, PRC Ambassador to Argentina Shen Yunao, and other diplomats attended Zhu Qizhen's meeting with Alfonsin.

Before meeting with Alfonsin, Zhu Qizhen met with Foreign Minister Dante Caputo. The meeting with Caputo, which was expected to be simply a protocol visit, evidently had other characteristics because it lasted 1 hour and 20 minutes.

The PRC intends to balance its trade with Argentina, since in 1986 PRC purchases from Argentina amounted to some $340 million, while Argentine purchases from the PRC amounted to only $10 million.

The possible measures for reversing this situation were the central issue of the talks that Zhu Qizhen and his entourage held with Deputy Foreign Minister Ruiz Cerrutti and International Economic Relations Secretary Jorge Romero.

Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias took advantage of the presence of the PRC delegation in Argentina. This morning he came to Buenos Aires to talk with Zhu Qizhen about the possibility of restoring bilateral diplomatic relations.

Bolivia

Algerian Foreign Minister Visits, Holds Talks

LD111429 Algiers APS in English 1312 GMT 11 Oct 87

[Text] La Paz, 11/10/87 (APS)—Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi arrived Friday in Bolivia where he will pay an official visit at the invitation of his counterpart, Guillermo Bedregal. Taleb Ibrahimi came from New York where he led the Algerian delegation at the 42d session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Algerian-Bolivian political talks started Saturday by a tete a tete between the two ministers which enabled them to deal with problems of bilateral cooperation and certain regional and international questions.

Taleb Ibrahimi and the delegation accompanying him were welcomed at their arrival by the Bolivian minister of external relations, high officials in his department and the Algerian ambassador to Bolivia.

Press Communique Issued

LD121842 Algiers APS in English 1340 GMT 12 Oct 87

[Text] La Paz, October 12 (APS)—The international (?economic and political) situation, the achievements of the Nonaligned Movement, the importance of the South-South dialogue, the problems still confronting the developing nations, the political and the economic situation of Algeria and Bolivia and prospects of cooperation developments are the main points dealt with in the press communique issued following the visit of foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi to Bolivia.

Dr Ibrahimi who is currently touring three Latin American countries (Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador) held talks with his Bolivian counterpart Guillermo Bedregal Gutierrez.

During this visit, the two sides reviewed the world political and economic situation. The two ministers underlined the need to adopt a foreign policy oriented towards the attainment of objectives of peace, justice and international cooperation in conformity with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the goals set by the Nonaligned Movement, the communique noted.

Careful consideration [words indistinct] considerably contribute to the defense of the fundamental rights of the developing nations.

[Words indistinct] their efforts in order to promote a system of negotiations particularly under the UN auspices in order to reach concrete results in respect of the defense of raw materials and contribute to the creation of new industrial, commercial, financial and technological capacities for the developing countries. On another turn, the two ministers examined the Western Sahara conflict. They reaffirmed in this regard the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence, noting that OAU resolution and UN resolution 41/16 could serve as basis to the settlement of this conflict. They also reaffirmed their countries' committment to the positions taken by the Nonaligned Movement on the Middle-East crisis and the Palestinian question. They further reaffirmed their support for the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East for the satisfaction of the Palestinian people's national rights.

Coca Plants in Cochabamba, Chapare Destroyed

PY152233 La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 28 Sep 87 p 1

[Excerpts] Villa Nueva, Cochabamba, 27 Sep (*Presencia*)—The 1,900 inhabitants of Villa Nueva—a town with 380 hectares of coca farms—who have decided to comply with the eradication plan, today unearthed coca plants in the presence of Anibal Aguilar Gomez, the under secretary for alternative development. [passage omitted]

Presencia witnessed peasants destroying the plants and listened to the request of men and women who urged the government to comply with the commitments it has made to the peasants. They said they did not want this plan to be like the previous one, launched in the presence of U.S. senators, however; they did not want a failure to fulfill commitments and promises.

In the town of Estancita, Chapare Province, peasants lead by their leader, Julio Rocha, also destroyed coca plants. By noon they had destroyed 1 hectare and Alternative Development Under Secretariat officials have given them a $2,000 check, according to the plan. [passage omitted]

Julio Rocha added that peasants who joined in the 1985 coca eradication program are concerned because they only received $350 per coca hectare that was destroyed to pay for labor costs and because the government did not comply with the commitments made within the framework of the development program.

Rocha also said these peasants, who have already destroyed 340 hectares in keeping with the agreement, expect economic compensation according to what has been decided.

BRIEFS

Ties With Belize Established

The foreign ministers of Bolivia and Belize—Guillermo Bedregal and Dean Barrow, respectively—signed an agreement in New York establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries as of today. [Excerpt] *[La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 5 Oct 87 PY]*

Brazil

Further on Cabinet,Political Situation

Minister Wants To Resign

PY151707 Sao Paulo Radio Bandeirantes in Portuguese 1600 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] Science and Technology Minister Renato Archer has said that he wishes to leave his ministry. He tendered his resignation more than (20) days ago and on that occasion he was told that,nonetheless, the government counts on his support. [indistinct passage omitted]

Sarney Receives PMDB Support

PY151150 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes yesterday briefed President Sarney on the PMDB Executive Board decision. He visited President Sarney yesterday at Planalto Palace and handed him a note issued by the PMDB Executive Board, reaffirming the party's support of the government, although not complete support as desired by the president. Among the points not supported by the PMDB note are the government system and the presidential term.

Planalto Palace Spokesman Frota Netto stated that the support given by Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes is much broader than the note itself.

[Begin Frota Netto recording] President Sarney thanked Deputy Ulysses for his support to the presidency. This support given personally by Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes is much broader than the support given by the PMDB note. [end recording]

Last night, 22 PMDB congressmen visited the Planalto Palace at the invitation of Civil Household Chief Ronaldo Costa Couto to make an assessment of the note supporting the president.

They met with President Sarney, and said that Sarney received the note very well. PMDB General Deputy Milton Reis, Minas Gerais State, will give us further details on the meeting with the president.

[Begin Milton Reis recording] The president received the note very well. Of course it is not an ideal note. But it was the only possible note, and he interpreted it as a note in which most PMDB leaders, headed by Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes, want to enhance the government, want a democratic transition, and hope for the conclusion of the Constituent Assembly works. [end recording]

Satisfied with the support he received, the president now feels that he has the necessary support to begin the administrative reform next week as soon as he returns from his trip to Venezuela.

Magalhaes Criticizes Maciel

PY090303 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 2255 GMT 8 Oct 87

[Text] Communications Minister Antonio Carlos Magalhaes has criticized the president of his political party, the PFL. He does not think the meeting PFL leader Marcos Maciel presided over in Rio de Janeiro today reflects the viewpoint of the great majority of party members.

[Begin Magalhaes recording] Senator Marcos Maciel had our support when he decided it was time to sunder the Democratic Alliance but he didn't even bother to listen to the party leadership or executive board.

Now, in order to voice support to President Sarney, he wants to hear the party executive board and leadership's opinion. Despite this, we, who support President Sarney because his program fits in perfectly with the PFL's, are going to voice our support to President Sarney today. [end recording]

Bresser Meets With Military Ministers

PY151629 Sao Paulo Radio Bandeirantes in Portuguese 1600 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] Finance Minister Bresser Pereira held a secret meeting with the military ministers. However, the news leaked; otherwise it wouldn't be published in today's newspapers.

Bresser and the ministers discussed the military sector's salary demands. The meeting lasted 1 and 1/2 hours and Bresser (?commented) that he was recommended [as heard] to comply, at least partially with the ministers' demands.

Iraq Exchanges Oil for Volkswagen Cars

PY110142 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2055 GMT 7 Oct 87

[Text] Brasilia, 7 Oct (EFE)— Petrobras Trade Director Carlos Sant'anna reported today in Brasilia that an Iraqi delegation will come to Brazil this month to negotiate with Petrobras, Volkswagen of Brazil, and government organizations for the purchase of Brazilian cars in exchange for oil.

Brazil will deliver 100,000 cars, mostly Volkswagen cars, Passat model. In exchange, Iraq will deliver 25,000 barrels of oil a day from 1988 to 1999. The source reported that the entire operation amounts to $600 million.

This will be the second such agreement reached by Petrobras and Volkswagen of Brazil with the Baghdad government. Two years ago, Brazil exported 100,000 Passat cars to Iraq in exchange for oil.

Carlos Sant'anna recently attended a debate on the exchange of products at a seminar entitled "A View of the International Financial System," held at the Rio de Janeiro Chamber of Commerce. On that occasion, Sant'anna recalled that Petrobras was the first Brazilian enterprise to conduct this type of operation.

In 1967, Brazil exported rubber latex to Venezuela in exchange for oil. Currently, 25 to 30 percent of the oil imported by Brazil is paid for by exporting Brazilian products.

According to Sant'anna, this year Petrobras will buy oil valued at $500 million and other goods valued at $200 million under the terms of exchange agreements.

Federal Police Investigate Mayor's Murder

PY141236 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] The federal police have been instructed to investigate the murder of Boa Vista Mayor Silvio Leite. He was fatally shot on Friday, 9 October.

Justice Minister Paulo Brossard has stated that he is closely following the investigations regarding the murder of Boa Vista Mayor Silvio Leite, but declined to comment on the possible involvement of Roraima Governor Getulio Cruz in the crime.

[Begin Brossard recording] The murder case is under investigation. This investigation must be complete, broad, and as effective as possible. We hope that this crime will be cleared as soon as possible. Only then will we be able to say whether the governor of Roraima territory is involved or not. [end recording]

The justice minister has also denied that Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes has requested his intervention in the case. Deputy Guimaraes only briefed me on the incident, and I ordered the federal police to investigate the crime immediately, he stated.

[Begin Brossard recording] I have ordered the federal police to assume responsibility for the investigations of the crime. [end recording]

Regarding the possible dismissal of the Roraima governor, Brossard said that this falls under the jurisdiction of the president of the Republic, and that this will be possible only if the governor's involvement is confirmed.

Chile

Minister Speaks on Plebiscite, Elections

PY151439 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 0930 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] The main purpose of the plebiscite is to benefit the citizenry. If it so decides, the citizenry may support the name proposed to it, thus allowing the next president to govern with the support of the absolute majority. This was stated by Foreign Minister Ricardo Garcia during a speech at a meeting of the Chilean-German Chamber of Commerce that took place in a Santiago hotel.

He also recalled that throughout Chilean history there were presidents who governed with the support of only 32 or 34 percent of the citizenry. He explained that the current Constitution will prevent this situation.

[Begin Garcia recording, in progress] ...the plebiscite thus demands that the citizenry vote directly for the name proposed to it if it wishes, in order to allow that president to govern with the support of the majority right from the start. That is the purpose of the plebiscite.

(?If the citizenry does not vote) a competitive election will be held according to the Constitution. A president must be elected and if no one obtains an absolute majority, a second round will be held during which the voter will have to give up his first vote to support one of the two candidates who received a relative majority during the previous [words indistinct].

That is the difference. The Constitution wishes to strengthen the position of the first president elected. [end recording]

Minister Garcia gave assurances that no one in Chile doubts that a new presidential period will begin in this country on 11 September 1989. He said that the government wishes for a free society, respectful of individual initiative, to truly be consolidated in Chile.

Junta Member Comments on 7 Oct Incidents

PY141135 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Admiral Jose Toribio Merino has stated that the charges pressed by the government against 39 political, labor, and social leaders who called the stoppage on 7 October are necessary because these social leaders treat their fellow countrymen in an inhuman way. Government junta member Adm Merino, who made this statement after a Legislative Branch [government junta] ordinary session, said: There was no stoppage on 7 October.

[Begin recording] [Merino] There was no stoppage on the so-called day of protest, and if there was, it was not really a stoppage, because the workers did not fail to go to their jobs. But vandals, assassins, and the like perpetrated all kinds of vandalism and crimes in the shanty towns which harbor the most defenseless people, the people with the greatest needs, and where people suffer the most from the effects of these kinds of disorders.

[Reporter] Do you believe this justifies the filing of charges?

[Merino] What?

[Reporter] Is this why charges have been made?

[Merino] Of course. How can it not be justified if one of the main tasks of the government is to safeguard peace and order within the country and safeguard the life and security of the people and their properties. Therefore, this is the least we can do against those who encourage these actions, particularly because we know that those who threw Molotov cocktails were being paid 2,000 Chilean pesos each. Therefore, there is no doubt that the pressing of charges is absolutely necessary because the way these people have treated their fellow countrymen is inhuman. That is all. Thank you. [end recording]

In concluding, Admiral Merino would not make any statement regarding the five youngsters who have been missing since 13 September.

Goverment-University Commission Talks Fail

PY151221 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] The negotiations between Education Minister Juan Antonio Guzman and members of the commission of professors representing the University of Chile council have failed.

This is reported in a communique issued by the university council which states that, in view of a request made by the professors, a commission has proceeded to hold negotiations at the government level.

The commission is comprised of Carlos Maria Sotomayor, chairman of the Chilean Academy of Social Sciences; Armando Roa, chairman of the Chilean Academy of Medicine; and Claudio Anguita, former dean of the Physics and Mathematics Sciences College.

The commission met twice with Education Minister Juan Antonio Guzman. During these meetings, they discussed and studied the basic issues concerning the university conflict.

The communique adds that the different parties were unable to arrive at an agreement during these meetings.

The university council spokesman has said that despite the failure of the negotiations, it will continue to seek other alternatives to resolve the university conflict.

Teachers Suspend Activities

PY151903 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Excerpts] According to (Patricio Basso), coordinator of the university teachers associations, teachers of most of the Chilean universities have suspended all activities for the day. He gave a detailed report on the teachers strike. Activities were totally paralyzed at the following universities: De la Frontera, Concepcion, Valparaiso, Santa Maria Catholic University of Valparaiso, University of Chile of Valparaiso, and Blas Canas Institute.

Meanwhile, a partial strike is being held at the Valdivia Professional Institute. Although no strike is being held at the Osorno Professional Institute and the La Serena and Catholic Universities of Santiago, they are holding teacher assemblies.

(Basso) explained that this stoppage is only the first step toward a national mobilization in defense of the university teachers of Chile. [passage omitted]

(Patricio Basso) said he was not surprised at the negative results of the talks between the education minister and a University of Chile teachers delegation. He said the teachers must now turn to other government levels to find a solution to the university conflict. [passage omitted]

Bishops Open 16th Social Week Forum

PY151207 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0434 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] Santiago, 13 Oct (EFE)—In a speech addressed to the first session of the 16th Social Week of Chile, Jaime Silva, president of the forum, today said that violence has not yet been eradicated from Chile.

He said that "five persons have recently been reported missing, 12 died violently in June, and an Army officer was abducted 43 days ago."

Episcopal Conference Secretary General Msgr Sergio Contreras and three bishops from Chilean towns opened the Social Week, which is sponsored by the Chilean Catholic Church and which will last until 18 October.

In his speech, Jaime Silva outlined the reasons for selecting this year's subject: Development and Solidarity, which are considered as two foundations for peace.

Silva also alluded to the conflictive situation within the University of Chile, where a strike has been underway for 2 months, by asking: "Can there be any development if the cradle of thinking and research is submitted to such repression?"

He thus alluded to the dismissal of 100 professors, 4 deans, and the 35 members of the faculty association board of the University of Chile, the country's main institution of advanced learning.

Univeristy of Chile rector Jose Luis Federicci, who was directly designated by General Pinochet, today announced a 30-percent salary reduction for the striking professors.

Colombia

Minister Denies Army Role in Pardo Death

PA151928 Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1730 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Interview with Defense Minister General Rafael Samudio Molina by reporter Hugo Sierra at the presidential palace in Bogota; no date given—recorded]

[Text] The summit meeting with the military hierarchy at the presidential palace has just ended. It was a meeting between President Virgilio Barco and Government Minister Cesar Gaviria Trujillo with the Colombian military. After the meeting, Defense Minister General Rafael Samudio Molina spoke to the reporters accredited to the presidential palace. Reporter Hugo Sierra has just informed us that there are three important issues involved: First, the minister has denied the accusations made by the Patriotic Union [UP] to the effect that the military was involved in Jaime Pardo Leal's murder; second, he said there will be no movement within the military hierarchy; and third, he said that public order in various regions of Colombia was important.

[Begin recording] [Samudio Molina] I must state that the Army recognizes the manner in which the president has guided, directed, and organized the Armed Forces in the fulfillment of its foreign and domestic mission.

[Sierra] Mr Minister, obviously the public disorder caused by the murder of Dr Pardo Leal was the topic of your conversation. What is the High Command's and the government's view of this?

[Samudio Molina] We did not discuss that issue specifically, although we undoubtedly reject and condemn his murder. We discussed various national issues that affect the country's security.

[Sierra] Mr Minister, through its top spokesmen, the UP has said that the president should request your resignation. What do you think of this?

[Samudio Molina] Those are merely statements. Anyone can make statements; it's everyone's right, and statements can be made not only against the defense minister, but against any cabinet minister or public official. These positions are designated by the people authorized to make such statements.

[Sierra] Was the topic of guarantees for the UP in the next mayoral elections discussed? What will the government do from now on— since it is committed to a campaign against delinquency and crime—to improve the country's security even a little?

[Samudio Molina] We discussed general topics, not only guarantees for the UP. We discussed guarantees for all Colombians, for all the political parties, the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the UP, and any organization that exists or may emerge—groups, subgroups, any citizen. The government will provide the guarantees. [end recording]

Ecuador

Foreign Minister on Restoring Nicaraguan Ties

PA131315 Quito Voz de los Andes in Spanish 1200 GMT 10 Oct 87

[Text] Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Rafael Garcia Velasco has confirmed in Guayaquil that Ecuador has sought talks in order to reestablish diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. He pointed out, however, that a neutral place should be found for negotiations. Ecuador has proposed holding talks in Caracas, during a SELA meeting, or in New York, the foreign minister said.

He had announced the possibility of these negotiations, but Public Information Secretary Marco Lara Guzman then asked him why he had used the word, could. The foreign minister responded by saying this was because Ecuador just recently voiced this position.

Garcia Velasco stated that the Ecuadoran Government and people are willing to restore formally something that has never been broken, and that is the friendship between the peoples. In conclusion, he pointed out that diplomatic negotiations always demand that there be reciprocal concessions, that the two each walk halfway down the same path in order to meet at a certain point, the foreign minister said.

Peru

Riot Police, Tear Gas Used in Bank Takeovers

PA151604 [Editorial Report] Lima Panamericana Television Network in Spanish at 1200 GMT on 15 October carries a 12-minute report on the Peruvian Government's nationalization of banks in that country. Abel Salinas, minister in charge of the National Social Communications System, announces that the seizure of the Credit Bank, Wiese Bank, and Credit Finance Company was peaceful, despite the impressive display of police force at the financial institutions in question.

A reporter says that at the Credit Bank headquarters the situation was "serious." The police arrived at 0730 and dispersed crowds with tear gas. The video shows police deploying in the streets, firing tear gas and swinging clubs. Reports indicate they were on hand to facilitate the administrators' entry. The reporter says the administrators, headed by banker Romulo Leon Ramirez, entered the Credit Bank at 1700 after the police broke down a side door with a tank, while bank workers stood outside shouting: "We want to work." There is a medium shot of workers chanting.

The same reporter says a similar situation took place at the Credit Finance Company, where at 1500 approximately 200 heavily armed policemen violently entered the installation. The video shows police, in riot gear, inside a building. Incidents similar in nature also took place at the Wiese Bank. The reporter says policemen entered the building by force, after which administrator Guillermo Shwartzman entered, displaying "an arrogant attitude." Outside, crowds were dispersed with tear gas by the police.

Shwartzman subsequently says, in a news conference, that the bank will remain open to the public and will continue operating normally.

Police Actions Criticized

PA152135 Lima Panamericana Television Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 15 Oct 87

["Paper Window" commentary by Luis Rey de Castro]

[Text] Good morning, friends. In an official communique that he read last night, Minister Abel Salinas said that the takeover of two banks and one finance company was carried out without major incidents. Indeed, as most of the country saw on their television screens, the takeover was carried out in perfect order by breaking into buildings, breaking down doors, using police cordons and tear gas, pushing and shoving, and using water cannons and approximately 200 policemen of the Civil Guard and Republican Guard, including their specialized troops. Break-ins, stormings, and plenty of tears—in other words, as Minister Salinas said, without major incidents.

If in Congress we had a circus, yesterday we saw a cowboy movie. The sheriff was Mr Romulo Leon, chairman of the government-appointed administrative committee, which supposedly will replace the boards of directors and shareholder boards in the financial system. The sheriff is always the good guy in the movies. The bad guys are no longer only the four powerful bankers. They are also the 4,000 bank workers who have legally bought the Banco de Credito de Peru. According to Leonisio Romero, former president of the bank, the representatives of the new shareholders will meet on Saturday to elect their board of directors. The sheriff has not been invited to this general shareholders meeting because he is not a shareholder.

I was going to devote today's commentary to congratulating the government of the APRA, particularly the Peruvian president, his parliamentary majority, and his economy minister, for what seemed to me to be a great success and achievement. Instead of four powerful undemocratic bankers, the financial system already has 4,000 democratic and popular bankers. As we were told in many speeches in provinces and districts, this is the ideal that the Peruvian economy seeks. However, it seems that this is not the aim. It seems that the 4,000 bankers are not sufficiently powerful to buy a bank. They are just workers. They are not even from the country. They do not have cash. The shares they have bought cannot be used as a guarantee even though the price they paid is the one quoted in the stock market and not that on the books. They probably are not APRA members.

Mrs Magda Benavides and the Federation of Bank Workers, which supposedly defend the interests and the finances of the workers, also do not like the fact that there are 4,000 new bank shareholders and that there is democratic and popular ownership in the financial system. Naturally, Mrs Benavides and Marxism-Leninism cannot like the existence of small bankers and shareholders. Therefore, the representatives of the bank workers are against the bank workers. Congratulations, Mrs Benavides: Continue fighting so all the economic power will pass into APRA hands. Marx and Lenin are going to thank you for it.

We do not know what new segment of the cowboy film we will see today. We must suppose that the tear gas and the tanks will be protecting the streets while the specialized assault troops use the rooftops to enter the bank of Mr Francisco Pardo Mesones, who has been waiting for them for the past 2 months.

It is evident that despite all the courage, sense of responsibility, and integrity in enforcing the decisions of the judicial branch, Judge Jaime Moran Cisneros cannot face the police attacks and break-ins alone. However, Judge Moran Cisneros' firm and impeccable attitude goes down in history as a lesson of a judicial branch that respects itself. Minister Salinas' words will also go down in history: without major incidents.

Algerian Foreign Minister Arrives on Visit

Meets With Garcia

PA132250 Lima Domestic Service in Spanish 1730 GMT 12 Oct 87

[Mercedes Jara report]

[Text] President Alan Garcia Perez held a private meeting with Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, who arrived on Sunday for a 3-day official visit.

The Algerian foreign minister arrived at the Government Palace at 1100 accompanied by Peruvian Foreign Minister Allan Wagner Tizon. He left the palace 45 minutes later.

During his visit, the Algerian foreign minister will meet with high-level government officials. Ibrahimi and Foreign Minister Allan Wagner Tizon will sign an agreement for the creation of a joint commission for technical, economic, commercial, and cultural cooperation. The Algerian minister will also be awarded the Great Cross of the Order of the Sun.

More on Talks With Garcia

LD132345 Algiers APS in English 1120 GMT 13 Oct 87

[Text] Lima, 13 Oct (APS)—Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi currently in Lima was received Monday by President Alan Garcia Perez to whom he handed a message from President Chadli Bendjedid. Talks dealt on the bilateral cooperation and prospects for its development.

Taleb Ibrahimi also informed President Alan Garcia Perez on the development of the situation in the Maghreb, in relation with President Bendjedid's recent initiative aimed at hastening the Maghrebin unitary process and the problems faced by Western Sahara. On his part the Peruvian head of state presented to his interlocutor the situation in Latin America, pointing out the economic development challenge in the continent and peace in Central America in the prospect of implementation of the peaceful settlement agreed on lately in Guatemala.

On another turn, the first session of the Algerian-Peruvian talks took place Monday presided over by Ibrahimi and his Peruvian counterpart Alan Wagner, and devoted to the present crisis in the international economic relations and the necessity of a collective action of the Third World to preserve their developing process.

A second working session is to be held Tuesday for an exchange of views between the two ministers on international and regional issues. [Words indistinct] at the end of this second session.

Press Communique Issued

LD141531 Algiers APS in English 1043 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] Lima, 14/10/87 (APS)—A press communique sanctioned the visit in Peru of Dr. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Political Bureau member, foreign affairs minister, from 11 to 13 October.

During his stay in this capital, Dr. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi was audienced by the head of state, Dr. Alan Garcia Perez, and he had talks with Mr Allan Wagner Tizon, [words indistinct] analyzed the present international situation and the Esquipulas II accords as well as the Contadora Group efforts for the [words indistinct] the Western Sahara [words indistinct] question and the persistency of the apartheid and aggression South African policy against the frontline countries.

"Examning the bilateral relations the two ministers agreed on the necessity to more reinforce the excellent relations which exist between the two countries through concrete actions and the creation of mechanisms of consultations on aspects of common interest. [quotation marks as received]

Agreement on Commission Signed

PA141957 Lima Domestic Service in Spanish 1730 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] The Peruvian and Algerian foreign ministers signed an agreement to create a joint commission for economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation for the benefit of both countries.